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ABSTRACT
1Introduction
In this study we ask: To what extent do the tax-and-transfer regimes in ten
advanced countries  equalize opportunities, among their citizens, for income acquisition?
We intend to subject an idea in contemporary political philosophy to  economic analysis,
and thereby to evaluate the performance of fiscal systems with respect to one arguably
important ethical measure.
Many scholars have pondered, over the years, the justness or fairness of taxation.
A well-known tradition views taxation as an instrument to maximize average utility in a
society – this is the ‘utilitarian’ objective.  A more recent tradition captures social welfare
with a Rawlsian objective function: here,  just taxation is that which maximizes the
welfare of the least well-off individual.   More recently, political philosophers of an
egalitarian stripe have criticized the Rawlsian view as ignoring the issue of personal
responsibility.   These writers  (Dworkin [1981a,b], Arneson [1989, 1990], Cohen [1989],
and Roemer [ 1993, 1998], to name several)  have argued that quality of outcomes,
which the Rawlsian objective considers the ideal, is not ethically desirable, for it fails to
recognize that differences in outcomes due to differential efforts or ambitions by
2individuals are ethically acceptable.1   What these writers propose is that egalitarians
should seek not to equalize outcomes, but only seek to equalize that part of outcomes
which are due, in Dworkin’s phrase, to  “brute luck,” which, roughly speaking, means to
factors for which the individual in question should not be held responsible, because they
were utterly beyond his control.  In the terminology we adopt below,  it is desirable to
equalize outcomes in so far as they are different because of the influence of differential
circumstances, but not in so far as they are due to differential effort.  We call these
theories, generically, equal-opportunity theories.
Utilitarianism is a welfarist theory: to order two social alternatives   (say, the
outcomes citizens enjoy under two different tax regimes), the utilitarian requires
knowledge only of the utilities of individuals under the two social alternatives.  Similarly,
                                                
1 We are here being, perhaps importantly, unfair to Rawls.  For Rawls advocated the
equality of primary goods, not outcomes.  Nevertheless, in economic applications, most
researchers have substituted ‘utility’ or ‘income’ for Rawls’s ‘primary goods.’  In the
former case, this move can be made consistent with Rawls by arguing that the utility
function adopted by the researcher is really an index of primary goods (say, income and
leisure).
3the Rawlsian objective, as it is commonly used by economists, is welfarist – one need
only know the welfare (or some other outcome) of the worst-off individual under two
alternatives to render a judgment of which alternative is better.  In contrast, equal-
opportunity theories are non-welfarist: for to render a judgment about which social
alternative is better, one need know the efforts expended by the individuals in the two
alternatives, not simply the outcomes they enjoy under them.
Most citizens of western democracies are not welfarist: for example, they
generally support transfers to poor compatriots if the latter are poor due to no fault of
their own; many fewer, however, support generous transfers if the recipients’
impecunious position is due to irresponsible behavior – in our terminology, to low effort.
Thus, not only the outcome, but how it came about, matters.  If we are correct in
conjecturing that most people in many countries do have this non-welfarist ethic, then it
is unlikely that they will assent to the recommendation of a welfarist optimal taxation
exercise.   In contrast, we think that the theory of equal opportunity that we employ here
is closer to the ethics of many, if not most, western democrats, and therefore the non-
welfarist optimal taxation exercise of this article is more in tune with popular sentiments.
We do not exclude the possibility, however, that in some of the more egalitarian
4European countries, where there is an explicit political focus on equality of outcome,
citizens may endorse the welfarist view.
We formalize the posing of our title’s question with Roemer’s (1998) theory of
equality of opportunity.   The vocabulary of that theory consists principally in five words:
objective, circumstances, type, effort, and instrument.    The objectiveis the condition of
individuals whose acquisition we desire to equalize opportunities  for –  in the present
case, income acquisition.   Circumstances  are attributes of the environment of the
individual  (which may be social, genetic, or biological) that influence the extent to which
he will achieve the objective, and which are ‘beyond his control,’ or, more generally,
attributes for which society deems him not to be responsible.  Effort  is that constellation
of behaviors, on the individual’s part, which together with circumstances will determine
the value of the objective for him.   (Where does luck belong?  As the reader shall see, we
will argue that it ‘averages out.’  Nevertheless, at the level of the individual, it will appear
as effort. )     We use the instrument – often the provision of resources—to compensate
individuals with disadvantageous circumstances, in order to improve their chances of
realizing an acceptably high value of the objective.   The purpose of  equal-opportunity
policy is to ‘level the playing field’ among individuals, who compete for an objective, in
the following sense: After that leveling,   a person’s acquisition of the objective should be
5a function only of his effort and not of his circumstances.  Thus, the instrument is used to
compensate those with poor circumstances so that, in expectation, after the compensation,
a person’s achievement of the objective will be sensitive only to his effort.2  Finally, a
type  is the set of individuals all of whom have the same circumstances.   Circumstances
partition the set of individuals into types.
It is, of course, a deep philosophical question, with  psychological and
neurophysiological components,  to determine exactly what constitutes the complete set
of circumstances for any given social problem.   In practice, we choose some
circumstances for the purpose of the computation, and define the partition of types with
respect to those.   We then arbitrarily attribute the variation in the acquisition of the
objective among those within a type entirely to differential effort.   Thus, in applying the
theory, we always view effort as the residual that explains differential outcomes (in
values of the objective), once circumstances have been delineated.  (Thus, the effects of
luck, as we said earlier, will be accounted for as ‘effort.’)     Because of this procedure,
the equal-opportunity policy we compute  in fact undercompensates  disadvantaged
                                                
2 Thus, the troughs in the playing field are the disadvantages some face due to unfortunate
circumstances.
6individuals, for some of what we will call ÔeffortÕ should (if we had the data and
knowledge) be ascribed to a more inclusive set of circumstances.
To summarize the ethic behind equality of opportunity (EOp): Inequality of
outcome  due to the differential application of effort is morally all right,  but if it is due to
differential circumstances, then it is not morally all right, and is compensable by society.
The EOp view holds a person responsible for his effort, but not for his circumstances.
Let us now formalize this approach (here we review, very briefly, the presentation
of Roemer (1998)).    Let the circumstances and objective be given, let the set of types
defined by these circumstances be T, with generic element t ˛  T.   Suppose the value of
the instrument or policy  (say, some resource allocation or tax policy) is j,  chosen from
some set of feasible policies, F.    Then there will ensue some distribution of the value of
the objective within each type.  Think of there being a continuum of individuals of each
type.  Let vt( , ) be the value of the objective3 a  the pth quantile (where p ˛ [0,1]) of
                                                
3 The approach is somewhat unconventional in eclipsing the role of individual choice.
We do not represent the utility functions of individuals that lead them to choose different
outcomes when facing a policy.   Of course, those may be introduced  (see Roemer
(1998)).
7the distribution of the objective in type t, a  the policy j.   Our desire is to choose that
value of the instrument j which equalizes the value of the objective  across types  at any
given degree of effort.  Our next move is to identify all those who sit at the p th quantiles
of their type distributions of the objective as having expended effort in the same degree,
for any fixed p.
Suppose we  could measure effort directly, and observe an effort distribution in
each type.4   Those distributions would be characteristics of the types.  Some types
would have ‘better’ distributions of effort than others, and this must be due to their type,
that is, their circumstances.  Since our aim is to not hold persons responsible for
characteristics of their type, we should not hold them responsible for characteristics of
their effort which are due to their being in a disadvantaged type.  We require an inter-type
-comparable effort measure which factors out the goodness or badness of the effort
distribution per se.  This suggests that we measure a person’s effort by the quantile at
which he or she sits on the effort-distribution of his or her type, for the quantile measure
                                                
4 The reader should recall that effort here is not ‘labor’ or ‘intensity of labor,’ as is
commonly its meaning in economic analysis.  Our ‘effort’ is a multi-dimensional set of
behaviors, including principally the acquisition of skill, which engender the potential for
income acquisition.
8ranks a person’s effort by comparing him only to others of his type.  Since that measure is
relative, rather than absolute, it is as well a compelling inter-type comparable measure of
effort.
We thus declare: two individuals in different types have expended the same
degree of effort  if they sit at the same rank of the effort distribution of their types.  We
next note that outcomes are a function of circumstances, effort, and policy, a function
which is monotone increasing in effort  (ex hypothesis).  (Assume that luck averages out
for large samples.)   We now consider policies that treat all members of a given type
identically.  Then two individuals in different types who are at the same quantiles of their
respective effort distributions, at a given policy, also sit at the same quantile of the
outcome distribution of their types.  This follows from the monotonicity property just
mentioned.    It is essential to underscore that, for this monotonicity argument to hold, the
instrument / policy must treat all members of a given type identically.
Thus, our goal becomes: To choose that policy j which makes it the case that the
type distributions of the obj ctive are as close as possible to being equal.  More precisely,
we do not want to ‘equalize’ these distributions, but to ‘maximin’ them:  ‘equalizing’
could be achieved by driving the objective value to zero for everyone.  The formalization
9of the objective proposed in Roemer (1998) is to ‘maximin’ these distributions in the
precise sense of solving this program:
Max
ÎF
Min
t
0
1
ò vt( , )d . (1.1)
Program  (1.1) chooses that policy that maximizes the area under the lower envelope of
the functions  {vt(× , )}.
Program (1.1) is motivated as follows.  Suppose we fix, for the moment, a
particular quantile of effort, p.  The policy which maximins the value of the objective,
across types, for all those who sit at the p th   quantile of their effort distributions is
j p = ArgMax
jÎF
Min
tÎT
vt(p, j ) .
Here we have used the fact, deduced above, that those at a given quantile p of th ir type
distributions of the objective have expended the same degree of effort, which we may
also index ordinally as the p th  degree.  In general, there is a continuum of such policies,
{j p }, one for each p.  The first-best solution to our problem is achievable only when all
these policies are identical.  More generally, when this is not so, we require some second-
best compromise.  Program (1.1), our second-best approach, uses  an additive social
10
objective function in which the objective function of the citizens in each quantile p,
namely  Min
t Î T
vt(p, j) , receives  the same weight.
Social-choice enthusiasts will note that the program (1.1) is “Rawlsian” with
respect to outcomes attributable to differential circumstances, but “utilitarian” with
respect to outcomes attributable to differential effort.  It puts great value on reducing
differences due to differential circumstances, but no particular value on reducing
differences due to differential effort.
2,  Income taxation and transfers and the characterization of EOp policy
The income tax regime of a country, by which we mean the set of income taxes
and transfers which exists, is a device both for raising revenue for the government
budget, and for redistributing income.   We can ask: To what extent does the income tax
regime of a country equalize opportunities among its citizens for the acquisition of
income?  We shall render this question precise as follows.  We shall first partition the set
of citizens into several (indeed, three) types, based on a single circumstance: the level of
education of their parents.     We shall characterize a policy  as a mapping  from pre- to
post- fisc income.  We shall restrict ourselves to affine policies, and represent the generic
policy by an ordered pair (a, c):  if x is pre-tax income, then (1-a)x+c  is post-fisc income
11
under policy (a, c).  We shall define a set of feasible policies, F, for a country.   We shall
define, and indeed compute, vt( p ;a,c)  to be the post-fisc income of citizens at the p th
quantile of the post-fisc income5 distribution in type t (for t= 1,2,3)   at the policy (a, );
we shall then compute the solution to program (1.1).  This will be the policy that
equalizes opportunities for income.  We shall finally compare this policy with the actual
tax-and-transfer policy in the country.
In words, we will have computed the fiscal policy that makes it the case that the
distributions  of post-fisc income across the three types are ‘as close as possible to being
equal’ in the sense of our objective (1.1).  Program (1.1) makes no effort per e to shrink
the variation in incomes across effort levels, but only across types, which reflects the
view that differences in outcomes due to differential effort are ethically acceptable.
Our computation in fact corresponds to a familiar conception of equality of
opportunity, one based on mobility matrices.  Think of a mobility matrix whose rows are
labeled  ‘socio-economic status of the family a person comes from’ (here captured as his
parents’ level of education), and whose columns are various income levels.  Element ij of
the matrix is the fraction of persons from families whose parents were of socio-economic
status i and who end up earning income level j.    Equality of opportunity holds if the
                                                
5 Post-fisc income is defined as income minus income taxes plus transfer payments.
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rows  of this matrix  are identical: that is the distributions  of income should be the same
for types who come from different social backgrounds.  Our computation will find the tax
policy (a, c) that makes the rows of this matrix as close as possible to being equal (in the
maximin sense).
Let us continue interpreting (1.1).  Let  Gj
t (y) be the (cumulative) distribution
function of post-fisc income, y, in type t, at policy j.   Then by definition:
p = Gj
t(vt(p, j)) . (2.1)
Now  Gj
t , being a distribution function, is monotonic, and possesses an inverse, which we
denote (Gj
t )-1 .   Applying this inverse to (2.1), we have:
(Gj
t )-1 p( ) = vt p , j( ) . (2.2)
Substituting from (2.2) into (1.1), our objective becomes
Max
jÎF
Min
t
0
1
ò (Gj t )-1 p( ) dp . (2.3)
Now there is a simple geometric interpretation of (2.3). For simplicity let there be
two types, and suppose that their two distribution functions for a particular j,  Gj
1 and
Gj
2  ,  are as pictured in Figure 1. Then the integral in (2.3) is simply the area bounded by
the vertical axis, the horizontal axis, the line at the ordinate value one, and the left-hand
envelope of the graphs of Gj
1  and Gj
2  .
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In Figure 1, we have drawn the graphs of these two distribution functions as
intersecting in several places, for purposes of generality. But in our particular application, the
distribution functions of pre-fisc income, for the various types, will (usually) not cross, and
since the tax regime (a, c) is monotonic (a < 1), the post-fisc income distributions of
different types will also not cross.  Therefore, in our application, (2.3) says to choose to
maximize the area to the left of  the post-fisc distribution function of the most disadvantaged
type, bounded by the axes and line y=1.  But it is well-known (and easy to see) that this is
just the average post-fisc income of the most disadvantaged type.  Henc  our equal-
opportunity program reduces, in this case, to a simple prescription:
Find that policy that maximizes the average post-fisc income of the most
disadvantaged type.6
We must emphasize that this simple prescription, which does not generally hold in
equal-opportunity calculations,  is due to a particular feature of the present set-up: that the
policies we consider are monotonic across all individuals.   That is, if the pre-fisc income of
individual A is less than that of individual B, then so will be the order of their post-fisc
                                                
6 This prescription contrasts with the Rawlsian difference principle, which would be to
maximize the post-fisc income of the worst-off individual.  Rawls, thus interpreted,
would not hold individuals responsible for their effort levels, while the EOp view does.
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incomes.  This would not be the case if, for instance, we allowed policies which taxed
different types at different rates.   Such policies would, in general, cause the post-fisc
distributions of income of different types to cross, and the ‘simple prescription’ would be an
incorrect characterization of the equal-opportunity policy.
We now proceed to the optimal-tax calculation.  We shall observe, for each of the
countries in our sample, the pre-fisc and post-fisc distributions of income, in aggregate, and
by type.  We shall compute the best-fitting affine policy which explains the aggregate data,
which we denote  (aˆ , ˆ c ).   (We refer to a particular country throughout this explanation.)  As
we shall observe, these affine tax policies fit extremely well: despite statutory progressivity
in marginal tax rates, the observed tax-and-transfer policy is, for all practical purposes,
affine, in almost all countries of our study.7  We now attribute a uniform, quasi-linear utility
function
u(x,L) = x - L1 +1/
                                                
7 In an earlier paper ( Page and Roemer (in press)), we worked with a larger class of tax
policies, the set of quadratic income taxes.  This complicated the optimal-tax analysis
substantially, without adding anything important to the results.  Because of the ubiquity
of virtually affine effective income taxation in the countries in our study, we restrict
ourselves here to affine policies.
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to each citizen in the country, where x is post-fisc income and L is labor.    Recall that, for
this utility function, h is the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage.   For a citizen
who earns a wage of w, and faces a tax policy (a, c), the optimal labor supply is
 L(w;a,c) =
(1- a)w
ˆ a
é
ë ê
ù
ûú
h
,
where  ˆ º (1+
1
), and hence the individual’s pre-fisc income is
x(w;a,c) =
1 - a
ˆ a
é
ë ê
ù
ûú
h
w1 +h .
If g is the value of government services  (non-transfer payments) per capita, and if F
is the probability measure of wages,  then it follows that the government budget constraint is:
a (
1- a
ˆ aò )
h w1+h dF(w) = c + g.
Letting g be given,  we may express c as a function of a:
c = a(
1- a
ˆ a
)h B - g, (2.4)
where  B = w1+ò dF.    Thus, for g and F given, our policy space is now unidimensional.  To
be precise, we let the set of policies F for a country be the set of all pairs (a, c), where a
Î [0, 1], g is the observed value of government revenues from income taxation per capita,
net of transfer payments, and c is given by (2.4).   That is to say, we shall restrict our search
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(for the equal opportunity tax policy) to those policies which are revenue neutral,  in the
sense of holding constant the government revenue used for non-transfer-payment purposes.
We number types in ascending order of circumstantial advantage.  Let F1 be
the probability measure of wages in the most disadvantaged type, and let A = w1+ò dF1(w).
Then the average post-fisc income of the worst-off type at policy a is:
(1- a)(
1- a
ˆ a
)h A + a(
1 - a
ˆ a
)h B - g;
Assuming that the post-fisc distributions of income do not cross, EOp requires us to
maximize this expression over all feasible policies a in F.   (As we said, we are holding  g
constant.)  Setting the derivative of this expression with respect to a equal to zero and
solving gives us the optimal tax policy:
aEOp = Max[1-
h B
(1+ h )(B - A)
,0]. (2.5)
The intuition for this formula is as follows.  Typically, B will be  significantly larger
than A. In this case,  aEOp > 0.  But if the distribution of wages of the worst-off type is not
very different from the distribution of wages of the whole society, then B-A  will be small,
and , according to (2.5), aEop = 0.  This means that there should be no redistributive taxation
to equalize opportunities for income: any taxation would be counter-productive, given the
17
deadweight losses incurred, since there is so little inequality of opportunity, pre-fisc.   The
EOp policy, in this case, is simply to tax every citizen the lumpsum g. 8
We shall compare the actual tax regime to the EOp regime as follows.     We first
choose a ‘benchmark’ policy in F, namely the policy with c = 0.  This is the tax policy that
would tax all incomes at a proportional rate abench  that would  just suffice to raise government
expenditures of g per capita, and make no inter-citizen transfers.  We let V1 equal th average
post-fisc  income of the worst-off type at this policy.  We let V2 be the average post-fisc
income of the worst-off type at the observed policy ˆ a, and we let V3 be the average post-fisc
income of the worst-off type at the policy aEOp.  We now define
=
V2 - V1
V3 - V1
.
If n = 0, then the observed policy is the benchmark policy, and if n = 1,  then the
observed policy is the EOp policy.  Thus, n can be thought of as the extent to which the
observed policy achieves EOp, relative to the benchmark of ‘no transfers.’ Finally, it should
be mentioned that the observed policy might overtax in the sense that it redistributes more
than EOp requires.  In this case, we shall simply write “ n = OT,” for ‘overtaxation.’
                                                
8 For simplicity of exposition, we ignore the fact that persons of very low income cannot
pay the lump sum tax.
18
We next inquire into the ‘efficiency cost’ of achieving equality of opportunity – but
here “efficiency” is used in the traditional sense of “the size of the pie”.    We can ask: how
much would national income shrink (expand) if we were to pass from the present policy to
the EOp policy?   We define the efficiency, e, of EOp as follows:
=
x(w; EOp)dF(w)ò
x(w;ˆ )dF(w)ò
,
which is just the ratio of average pre-fisc incomes at the EOp and observed policies.  If e < 1,
then there is some cost, in loss of average incomes, in moving from the observed policy to
the EOp policy, and if e > 1, then there is an increase in average incomes in that move.
From the last two paragraphs, the reader must note that “the efficiency of present
policy with regard to the EOp objective” and “the efficiency cost of implementing EOp” are
two quite different ideas – although they are related: for if the first number (n) is close to one
then the second number (e) will also be close to one.
We next explain  how we compute the distribution of wages for a country, for it was
the wage distributions that we used in the deduction of the optimal tax, above.   We shall
observe incomes, pre- and post- tax and transfer,  not ‘wages.’  We shall assume that pre-fisc
income is produced by an individual who maximizes utility, and has a certain wage-earning
19
capacity.    We shall assume a given value for the elasticity h. (Indeed, our method will be
the perform the whole calculation for three values of h, for each country. It is clear that the
smaller is h, the smaller is the deadweight loss of taxation, and hence the larger will be the
marginal tax rate, p,  in the EOp regime.)  We calibrate a y assuming that the individual
with median income works one unit of time.  By hypothesis, at the observed policy ˆ a,
incomes must be related to wages by the relation:
x(w;ˆ  a, ˆ c ) =
1 - ˆ a
ˆ a
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
h
w1 +h . (2.6)
Thus, having the observed distribution of pre-tax income, we can invert  equation (2.6) and
find the distribution of wages, what we have denoted  F.   I  like manner, we compute the
distribution of wages in the most disadvantaged type, F1.   Thes  are the only distributions
that we need.
A final conceptual remark is in order.  Some will object that the ethics of our equal-
opportunity formulation are marred, because we (the ethical observers) take income a  the
opportunity equalisandum, but the citizens in the societies we study, by hypothesis,
maximize something else, their ‘utility’, as measure by the function u.   Non-paternalism
would seem to require that we, as well, take that utility as the opportunity equalisandum.  We
do not wish to make a principle of our choice: we could as well have carried out the exercise
20
with “utility” in the place of “income,”  and our results would differ little from what we
report below.  Our choice of income is dictated by a desire to work with a concept which
most people intuitively use when thinking about inequality – namely, income distribution.
Talking about how income distributions would change under the equal-opportunity policy is
less abstract than talking about how utility distributions would change9.
3.  The data sets
Our empirical analysis uses household survey  and administrative micro-data
form ten different countries, which allow us to calculate the pre and post-fisc income of
individuals,  and also contain information on their family background.
Tables 1 and 2 describe the main characteristics of the data sets.  Samples
refer to individuals who are male heads of household 25 to 40 years old (30 to 40 years
old for Denmark, 25 to 50 years old for Germany). The average age ranges from 32.3 to
37.6. Most samples contain between 1,000 and 2,000 observations.
                                                
9 A critic could still say that we should have used utility as the opportunity objective, and
then looked at changes in income distributions associated with the optimum of our social
welfare function.  We decided  not to do so.
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Income is expressed in per annum terms in thousands of units of local
currency. Two definitions of income are used. In the first specification (ST-income) pre-
fisc income is calculated by adding to the individual's labor income, the household capital
income divided by the number of adults in the household. (For Belgium, calculations do
not include the self-employed,  or data on capital income.) Starting with our measure of
pre-fisc income we add transfers and then subtract income and social security taxes, in
order to obtain a measure of post-fisc income. For the Nordic countries in our study we
have data on actual taxes paid by individuals in the sample. In all other cases, taxes were
simulated using available information on income and household characteristics and
applying tax laws.
We do as well a series of calculations  based on a second income definition
(EQ-income). We start by defining pre-fisc income as household total (labor plus capital)
income which is then equivalized to take account of differences in household size.  The
equivalence scale is the square root of household size (see Atkinson, Rainwater and
Smeeding (1995)).  Large household sizes are generally due to older children’s living at
home, and the prevalence of this practice differs across countries in our sample.  Post-fisc
income is calculated by adding benefits to and subtracting taxes from household pre-fisc
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income; the result is then divided by the square root of household size. Table 2 shows
that the mean household size in our samples ranges from 2.6 in Sweden to 3.8 in Spain.
In most countries, income tax payments of households are simulated.   The
simulation formulae tend to overestimate the taxes paid by high income groups, who can
practice sophisticated tax avoidance.   Thus, the extent to which actual tax systems
achieve equalization of opportunities for income acquisition is probably less than what
our estimates below indicate, based, as they are, on the simulations.
In order to obtain estimates of the actual mapping of pre-fisc into post-fisc
income, we regressed individuals' post-fisc income on their pre-fisc income. Table 1
shows the r2 statistics of the linear and quadratic regressions for each country, using the
ST definition of income.  Affineness of the effective tax regime appears to be a very good
assumption in all cases.
Table 3 shows the differences in the level and composition of tax revenues in
the countries of the sample. Our measure of post-fisc income is obtained by subtracting
from the pre-tax income the personal income tax and the social security contributions of
workers (which includes both the contributions of employees and, except for Belgium,
self-employed). To the extent that some (or all) of the other contributions are borne by
workers, the redistributive impact of the tax system may be underestimated. This could
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be particularly important in countries like Sweden, Italy or Spain where more than 70%
of the contributions are paid by employers.
Our next step consists in partitioning the samples into types based on
circumstances.     We define two different typologies of individuals: one characterizes the
individual by his parents' level of education, and the second characterizes the individual
by his parents' occupation.   In the first case we identify three educational levels (ED1 to
ED3) that create three sizeable groups. In the second case we define three  (sometimes
four)  occupational groups: farmers, unskilled manual workers, skilled manual, and
professionals and self-employed. Furthermore, for some countries we shall further refine
these typologies into a typology with six types, by partitioning each of the above-
described types into two elements, characterized by whether the individual received an
above or below average score on an IQ test taken during youth.
Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics associated with the first typology,
based on parental education, for all countries except for Great Britain where we use the
occupational typology. For each survey we partition the sample into three types (ED1 to
ED3) according to the  level of education of the more highly educated parent.    Table 1
shows the mean pre-fisc income of these groups. According to these basic statistics, the
mean income of the three types is very different in Spain and Italy. At the other extreme,
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we find Norway and Sweden with quite similar pre-fisc income levels across types.
Intra-type inequality (judging by the coefficient of variation) appears to be larger for type
ED3 than for the other types, in all countries except Germany-west and the Netherlands10.
Table 2 also shows that individuals in ED3 have, on average, between two and
five more years of education than those in ED1. The largest differences appear in Italy
and Spain, and may be partly responsible for the large degree of inter-type income
inequality (see below) observed in these countries.  Note, as well, that ED3 is younger
than ED1 in all countries, and so the higher income of the former group cannot be due to
more labor market experience.   Because of this age discrepancy, our sample also
underestimates the degree of unequal opportunities among the three ED types  (that is,
were our sample to contain ED3 individuals of the same age as ED1 individuals,
observed income differences would be greater)11.
4.   Results
Tables 4-7 present the results of four calculations, where type is defined as ED
(parental education) or OC (parental occupation), and where income is defined in either the
                                                
10 The coefficient of variation is very sensitive to outliers.  If three observations are removed from the
Dutch data set, then the coefficient of variation is largest for the ED3 type there, as well.
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ST or EQ manner.  These four tables present the results for the assumption h = 0.06.   We
also ran the calculations for h = 0.03 and 0.09, but do not report all those results.  We
concentrate our discussion on Table 4.
From the aobs and aEOp  columns of table 4, we see that the EOp marginal tax rate is
smaller than the observed marginal rate in Denmark, Norway, Sweden,  the Netherlands, and
Germany-west; in Germany-east,  there is no unambiguous inequality of opportunity, pre-
fisc, in the sense that the income distribution functions of the supposedly most disadvantaged
and middle types, cross severely .     This fact corresponds to the notation, in the n  colum ,
that these five countries are classified as ‘overtaxing’:  they tax more than equality of
opportunity , with respect to the ED definition of circumstance, requires.    It is particularly
notable that four of these five countries (excepting the Netherlands) have an EOp tax rate of
zero.  This means that, at the EOp optimum, government spending would be financed by
equal lump sum taxation of all citizens.  There is, with our utility function, no deadweight
loss with lump sum taxation.  The way to interpret this result is that the pre-fisc inequality
between types in these countries is so small that, even with a (fairly small) labor-supply
                                                                                                                                                
11 Along the same lines, the permanent income of ED3 individuals may be substantially higher than that of
ED1 individuals, a fact that is not captured in our analysis.
26
elasticity of h = 0.06, any proportional income taxation would produce a deadweight loss
more than counteracting the benefit of increased opportunity equalization.
Belgium is essentially taxing at the EOp optimum: its efficiency n is hardly below
unity.  Of the four remaining countries, Italy clearly has the least effective taxation, from the
EOp viewpoint: its efficiency is 0.16.  The US is not far behind, with an efficiency of 0.200.
Notably, although the observed tax rate in Spain is not terribly high ( 0. 376), its EOp
efficiency is quite good, at 0.748.  This is due to the large degree of pre-fisc inequality in
Spain.   Figures 2a , 2b, and 2c present the pre-fisc income distribution functions of the three
types in the US, Spain, and Denmark, respectively, from which this claim is evident.
It is worth recalling that our exercise defines the feasible set of policies as affine
taxation which are revenue neutral, with respect to the funding of non-transfer-payment
government spending (g).  Of course, much of that spending will also have an equal-
opportunity effect, such as monies spent on education and health, but we have not attempted
to estimate that effect.  We can, however, observe the relative magnitudes of this component
of spending in the abench  column of the table.   Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway,
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Sweden, and west Germany all spend more than 20% of national income on government
services.12
The r column of these tables reports a measure of pre-fisc inequality.  In Italy and
Spain, the average pre-fisc income of the least advantaged type is barely more than half of
the average pre-fisc income of the most advantaged type. In Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands,
and the two Germanies, this ratio is over 80%.   An interesting question would be to partition
the causes of this high pre-fisc ratio in the northern Europe among the following three:
population homogeneity, role of education, and role of the ‘solidaristic wage’ policy (that is,
small wage differentials).
The last column of the table reports the ratio of the size of the income pie at the EOp
tax regime to its size at the observed regime.  It is of course the case that countries that are
‘overtaxing’ have e > 1.   In Italy, we estimate that the cost of enacting an EOp tax policy
would be about 8% of national income; in the US, slightly less than 5%; in Great Britain (see
Table 6), also slightly less than 5%.
                                                
12 To be more precise, the abench column tells us the fraction of national income spent on
these services, which is funded by the income tax.   In addition, government services are
funded by other taxes.
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Table 8 reports the results of three calculations with different typologies.  The first
row takes the population sample as the immigrant population in Germany, and partitions
members according to the OC.ST typology.  There is no unambiguous pre-fisc inequality of
opportunity.  The second row uses the British sample, and types individuals as white or non-
white.  Again, there is no unambiguous pre-fisc inequality of opportunity.  We attribute this
to the fact that Asians and Blacks are not distinguished in this typology. (Thus, Asians have
incomes that are not lower than whites, and so the distribution functions of the ‘white’ and
‘non-white’ types cross.)   The obvious move would be to do so, but there are too few
observations in some of the type cells with a further refinement of type to do this.  The last
row of the table partitions the Netherlands sample into two types, defined by whether the
individual was born in Netherlands or abroad.   Interestingly, the Netherlands overtaxes with
respect to eliminating inequality of opportunity between these types.
Table 9 reports various calculations for the elasticity h= 0.03.  With this assumption,
there is very little deadweight loss to taxation, so EOp will generally require higher taxation
than when h= 0.06.  We observe, remarkably, that east Germany, Denmark, Norway and
Sweden continue to be classified as overtaxing.    Italy and the US now have efficiency
ratings of just above 0.12.
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How should one interpret the result that the northern European countries are all taxing
either at or above the EOp optimum? We suggest two alternative interpretations.  The first is
that, indeed, these countries are moving beyond an equal-opportunity ethic towards an ‘equal
outcome’ ethic.
We believe this is too hasty a conclusion. Recall that our method implicitly treats all
intra-type income differences not ascribable to the explicit circumstances we name as due to
‘effort.’  In the results thus far reported, we have characterized the individual’s circumstances
by one characteristic, the education or occupation of his parent.  This single characteristic
captures much of what inequality of opportunity consists in.  But it surely does not capture
the influence of all factors beyond a person’s control on his income earning capacity.
 The second interpretation is that other characteristics that we have ignored contribute
as well to inequality of opportunity.   Prominent among these is the natural ability of
individuals.
In four countries – the US, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands13 – we h ve
secondary data sets which contain data on IQ tests taken during youth.  (The tests were
                                                
13 We thank J. Hartog for providing us with the Brabant data set for the Netherlands.  See
Hartog (1992) for his work based on this data set.  We thank Erik Jorgen Hansen for
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administered at age 14 in Denmark, at age 13 in Sweden, at age 12 in the Netherlands, and in
the interval 15 -23 years in the US.)  Regardless whether the grade on these tests reflects
genetic endowment or family culture  (nature or nurture), it is a measure of the person’s
circumstances.  And even if there is a ‘hard work’ component to what IQ measures, since
these tests were taken in childhood, arguably before the ‘age of consent’ at which we should
view individuals responsible for their acts, we should as well consider it a measure of
circumstances.  Our next exercise refines the ED typology, in these four countries, into a six-
type classification, where each ED type is partitioned into two elements, corresponding to
‘above’ and ‘below’ average IQ.
Because the IQ data in each of these countries were not in our main sample, we
simulated these six types, in the main sample,  as follows.  In each country our secondary
data set contains the IQ data, information on parental education, and information on the
respondent’s income as a young adult.  We partitioned the samples in the secondary data sets
into the three ED types, and then calculated the numbers p(i,t), the fraction of individuals in
                                                                                                                                                
providing us with the data for Denmark from the SFI study
“Ungdomsforlobsundersogelsen”; see Hansen (1995) for his work using this data set.  We
thank Carl-Gunnar Janson for access to his data for Sweden.
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the ith  income quintile group of the tth ED type who scored above average on the IQ test.
(Thus, t  ranges from one to three, and i from one to five.)  We then returned to the primary
data set, partitioned each of the three ED types into five income quintiles, and then randomly
assigned each individual in the (i,t) c ll an IQ of ‘above average’ with probability p(i,t), and
an IQ of ‘below average’ with a probability of 1-p(i,t).  We then partitioned the primary
data set into six types, accordingly.   The panels of Table 10 present the matrix p for the four
countries.  We see that above-average IQ is generally associated with higher income, and
with more advantaged type.
Table 11 reports the results of the EOp calculation, for these four countries, for the
six-type typology, and compares it to the corresponding calculations for the ED.ST typology.
We see that, when IQ is accounted for, the Netherlands is no longer overtaxing .  To equalize
opportunities would now require a marginal tax rate of 70% in the Netherlands.  Denmark
and Sweden continue to overtax, although the EOp tax rate in Sweden is no longer zero, but
25%.    Most remarkably, even accounting for IQ, the EOp  taxation in Denmark should be
strictly lump sum.  Note that this is not explained simply by the degree of pre-fisc inequality.
Denmark has somewhat more pre-fisc inequality than Sweden: the below-average-IQ, low-
parental-education type in Denmark has an average pre-fisc income  of 71% of the average
pre-fisc income of the above-average – high-parental- education type , whereas the
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corresponding figure is 78% in Sweden.  The EOp calculation uses facts about the entire
distribution of incomes of the various types, which are only imperfectly reflected in this
single statistic.
5.   Conclusion
We have asked to what extent income taxation, in ten countries, equalizes
opportunities among young men for the acquisition of income.  The novelty of the equal-
opportunity approach is its partitioning of income differentials into two categories, the first
due to differential circumstances beyond the control of individuals, the second due to
individual variation in voluntary effort.   The equal-opportunity ideal uses the instrument at
hand (here, income taxation) to annihilate differentials of the first kind but not of the second
kind.  The corresponding ethic is that differences in outcomes due to circumstance  should,
from a moral viewpoint, be compensable at the bar of justice, while differences due to effort
should not be.
 Our method proceeds by singling out certain obvious circumstances, and attributing
all remaining variation in incomes to differential effort.  When we choose the level of
parental education as the single circumstance, we find that in northern Europe, income-
taxation regimes are either optimal from the EOp viewpoint, or go too far – in the Nordic
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countries, there is so little pre-fisc inequality of incomes across types that only lump sum
taxation is justified from the EOp viewpoint.  We then introduce native ability as a second
circumstance, and find that, remarkably, Sweden and Denmark continue to tax more than
equality of opportunity requires.
Were we to introduce finer variations in the delineation of circumstance – for
instance, by partitioning IQ into four intervals, instead of two – we might well find that
Sweden and Denmark do not continue to overtax from the EOp viewpoint.  Nevertheless, it
seems fair to say that these countries perform very well with regard to the EOp ethic.
Further work would be required to explain the low degree of pre-fisc inequality among types
in these countries, that accounts for their good performance with respect to the EOp criterion.
We  remark  on an efficiency issue that we have not thus far discussed: What is the
best instrument for equalizing opportunities for income acquisition?   Another possibly
effective instrument would be education.  We could, in principle, calculate how increasing
expenditures on education would effect the type distributions of income, and then evaluate
whether educational finance was a more efficient way of equalizing opportunities for income
acquisition than redistributive taxation.  While such an investigation is clearly beyond the
scope of the present paper, it should be remarked that the educational finance instrument
would not necessarily come out ahead.   For example, despite efforts of many countries to
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reduce educational barriers to members of disadvantaged types, those barriers remain
effectively quite high (see Shavit and Blossfeld (1993)).  In fact, sociological researchers of
stratification have suggested that  a low degree of income inequality fosters equalization of
educational and occupational opportunities, rather than the other way around. (For a thorough
discussion, see Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Jonsson, Mills and Müller (1996).)
Income taxation, blunt instrument though it may be for our purpose, may be one of the best
available.
Indeed, the difficulty of increasing the proportion of members of disadvantaged
types who pursue tertiary education is surely, to some unknown extent, due to their
preferences, and not to what we might think of as hard barriers (like imperfect credit
markets).    We might rightly consider those preferences, even if they are in large part
determined by circumstances, to be the responsibility of the individuals who hold them14, and
if so, the lower incomes that follow from their lower educational levels would not be
compensable at the bar of equal opportunity.    For further discussion of this philosophical
issue, the reader is referred to the last footnote, and to the appropriate references below.
                                                
14 Dworkin (1981b) considers preferences with which the individual identifies, whether or
not they were induced by circumstances, to be within the ambit of personal responsibility.
Roemer (1998), however, does not, for preferences might have been adopted to make life
manageable in an environment with bad circumstances (cognitive dissonance).
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TABLE 1
    DESCRIPTIVE    STATISTICS   
 Country SURVEY- Data used Mean Pre-fisc Income-ST definition
(Coefficient of Variation)
Tax regressions
R2 statistic
Year Acronym Sample size Taxes ED1 ED2 ED3 Total Linear Quadratic
Belgium 1992 PSBH 1,043 Simulated 659.64
(0.56)
802.92
(0.51)
913.18
(0.61)
745.18
(0.57)
0.92 0.93
Germany-W        1994       GSOEP               1,117       Simulated           44.169
          (0.57)
      50.971
     (0.77)
       51.074
         (0.59)
       45.744
     (0.61)
         0.95         0.95
Germany-E        1994      GSOEP                    517     Simulated           28.968
            (0.58)
   27.354
      (0.38)
       31.718
        (0.66)
     29.015
       (0.57)
         0.90          0.91
Denmark 1993 IDA-ISR 42,387 Observed 209 230 253 216 0.77 0.79
G. Britain 1991 BHPS 1,051 Simulated 227.43
(0.53)
253.80
(0.68)
318.76
(0.78)
288.79
(0.77)
0.98 0.98
Italy 1993 SHIW93 1,435 Simulated 24.56
(0.63)
34.58
(0.68)
45.66
(0.70)
36.11
(0.73)
0.97 0.98
Netherlands 1995 AVO 1,758 Simulated 61.2
(0.78)
70.9
(0.61)
73.7
(0.60)
69.0
(0.65)
0.88 0.88
Norway 1995 SLL 595 Observed 231.50
(0.48)
248.90
(0.68)
254.90
(0.70)
243.10
(0.62)
0.91 0.91
Spain 1991 ECBC 1,986 Simulated 587.09
(1.29)
808.49
(1.29)
1182.24
(1.59)
716.06
(1.41)
0.95 0.97
Sweden 1991 LNV 825 Observed 141.91
(0.53)
144.39
(0.48)
161.62
(0.66)
146.98
(0.56)
0.73 0.73
US 1991 PSID 1,140 Simulated 26.62
(0.51)
30.89
(0.44)
38.66
(0.66)
31.99
(0.59)
0.99 0.99
NOTES: Annual income in thousands of local currency (monthly income for Belgium, weekly for Britain). Individuals are male household heads 25 to 40 years old (30 to 40 years old for Denmark).
TABLE 2
    DESCRIPTIVE    STATISTICS   
COUNTRY
DEFINITION OF EDUCATIONAL
LEVELS OF FATHERS (YEARS)
AVERAGE YEARS OF EDUCATION OF
INDIVIDUALS IN THE SAMPLE
AVERAGE AGE OF INDIVIDUALS
IN THE SAMPLE
MEAN
HOUSEHO
LD
SIZE
ED1 ED2 ED3 ED1 ED2 ED3 Total ED1 ED2 ED3 Total
Belgium <10 10-12 >12 10.4 12.4 13.9 11.6 34.0 33.0 32.5 33.3 3.30
Germany-W      < 10     10-13      >13          11.6         13.2           15.1        12.2          37.9        37.0        36.3          37.6            2.96
Germany-E      <10     10-13      >13          12.3         13.3           14.6        12.6          38.2       35.1        36.3          37.6           3.23
Denmark <8 8-13 >13          11.6         12.4           13.7        12.0 34.6 34.1 33.9 34.2 2.76
G.Britain OC1 OC2 OC3 12.1  12.3 13.9 13.2 33.2 33.0 32.5 32.8 3.06
Italy <5 5-7 >7 8.0 9.8 12.7 10.4 34.7 34.3 33.8 34.2 3.35
Netherlands <6 6-9 >9 10.3 11.5 13.6 11.7 34.2 32.6 31.9 32.9
Norway <9 9-11 >11 11.2 12.0 13.1 12.0 33.3 32.0 32.0 32.5 3.03
Spain <4 4-8 >8 8.1 10.1 13.0 9.5 32.9 32.6 31.4 32.6 3.76
Sweden <8 8-11 >11           11.5         12.5          14.4      12.4 32.8 31.7 31.7 32.3 2.60
US <12 12 >12          12.6         13.4          14.7       13.5 33.8 33.8 33.2 33.6 3.17
NOTES: Individuals are male household heads 25 to 40 years old (30 to 40 years old for Denmark).  ‘EDi’ is the ith type for the ‘paren tal education’ typology. ‘OCi’ is the ith  type for the
typology based on father’s occupation.
TABLE 3
   TAXES   IN     OECD     COUNTRIES   IN    1990   
 Country INCOME AND PROFIT TAXES (%GDP) OTHER TAXES (% GDP) TOTAL
÷
GDP
Personal Other Total Soc.Security
Worker
Soc.Security
Other
Property Consumption Other
Belgium 14.0 2.4 16.4 5.4 9.3 1.2 11.6 - 44.0
Germany-W 10.1 1.8 11.9 6.7 7.0 1.2 9.8 0.0 36.7
Germany-E           n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Denmark 25.6 2.8 28.4 1.2 0.3 2.1 16.4 0.4 48.7
G. Britain 10.5 3.8 14.3 2.6 3.6 2.9 11.6 1.5 36.6
Italy 10.3 4.0 14.3 3.7 9.2 0.9 11.0 0.1 39.2
Netherlands 11.0 3.4 14.4 13.3 3.3 1.6 11.8 0.1 44.6
Norway 10.9 3.8 14.7 4.0 6.9 1.2 14.9 - 41.8
Spain 7.4 3.1 10.5 3.4 8.7 1.9 9.7 - 34.2
Sweden 21.4 1.8 23.2 0.6 14.5 2.0 13.9 1.5 55.6
US 10.1 2.0 12.1 3.3 3.6 3.1 4.6 - 26.7
SOURCE: Revenue Statistics (OECD).
country aobs cobs aEOp cEOp abench r n e
Belgium   .531 148.9 .535 158. .316 .72 .9996 .9995
Germany-
west
   .364 5539.6 0 -17477. .225 .85 OT 1.028
Germany-
east
  .330 4887.7 SVC SVC .139 .82 NA NA
Denmark    .440 41021 0 -53989 .251 .83 OT 1.035
Italy   .232 2.688 .819 21.3 .156 .53 .160 .920
Netherlands    .533 10410 .474 18736. .253 .83 OT 1.007
Norway   .393 45526 0 -63170 .258 .74 OT 1.030
Spain    .376 172.8 .605 663.9 .080 .51 .748 .973
Sweden    .524 46886 0 -30207 .203 .88 OT 1.046
G. Britain   no ED
data
US   .243 2036. .647 13578 .182 .69 .200 .955
Table 4: EOp policy, h=0.06, ED typology, standard (ST) definition of income
Key
aobs and cobs are the regression coefficients of the best-fitting line ypost = (1-a)ypre + c.  Thus, a is the marginal tax rate.
aEOp and cEOp give the optimal affine tax scheme, according to EOp.
abench  is the proportional tax rate which would just raise non-transfer-payment government revenue.  Thus, the larger abench, the larger is the ‘value of public
goods’ per capita.  The difference  aobs – a bench is the fraction of income taxation directed to redistribution.
r is a measure of pre-tax equality of opportunity; it is the ratio of mean ypre in the lowest type to mean ypre in the highest type.
2n is the extent to which actual policy achieves the EOp policy, from the ‘benchmark’.  ‘OT’ means there is overtaxation: actual policy is more redistributive than
EOp policy would be. ‘SVC’ means there is ‘severe crossing’ of the income CDF of the most disadvantaged type with other CDFs, and so our method of
computing the  EOp policy is inapplicable.
1-e is the fraction of shrinkage in the national wage bill  at the EOp policy, in comparison to the observed policy.  With overtaxation, e >1, and th  national wage
bill would increase under EOp.
3country aobs cobs aEOp cEOp  a  bench r n e
Belgium .555 178.9 .661 238. .260 .69 .90 .984
Germany-w.  .404 6247.8 .116 -6424. .215 .84 OT 1.024
Germany-e.  .365 6113.9 .227 4513. .126 .69 OT 1.012
Denmark .369 36435 0 -36000 .182 .81 OT 1.028
Italy .247 2.428 .829 16.43 .154 .46 .186 .915
Netherlands .545 8660 .510 18699 .256 .75 OT 1.004
Norway .389 47454 .215 2773 .202 .76 OT 1.015
Spain .400 341.6 .556 823.7 .100 .50 .84 .982
Sweden .569 48367 0 -24258 .185 .87 OT 1.052
G. Britain no ED data
US na na na na na na na na
Table 5: EOp policy, ED typology, EQ definition of income, h=0.06
Note: When aEOp is 0, there is no redistributive taxation at EOp; everyone contributes an equal lump-sum to fund public goods. Hence
when this occurs, cEOp < 0.  This occurs when pre-fisc inequality among types is so small that redistributive taxation is not worthwhile,
because of deadweight loss.
4country aobs cobs aEOp cEOp abench r n e
Belgium .531 148.9 .278 -71.4 .324 .92 OT 1.03
Germany-w. .361 5470 .031 -14831 .220 .863 OT 1.025
Germany-e.1 .328 4825 0 -6891 .156 .833 OT 1.024
Denmark  .440 41022 0 -53989 .250 .90 OT 1.035
Italy .232 2.688 .645 16.63 .156 .73 .237 .955
Netherlands no OC
data
Norway .393 45526 0 -63170 .259 .77 OT 1.030
Spain .376 172.8 .758 768.8 .090 .42 .568 .945
Sweden no OC
data
G. Britain .364 38.43 .709 171.5 .070 .72 .615 .954
US .243 2036. .663 14001 .182 .70 .191 .952
Table 6: EOp policy, OC typology, ST definition of income; h=0.06
                                                
1 For Germay-east, the worst-off type is ambiguous; the pre-tax CDFs cross.
5country aobs cobs aEOp cEOp abench r n e
Belgium .555 178.9 .397 84.7 .257 .89 OT 1.018
Germany-w. .405 6543 .410 11158 .223 .837 .999 .9995
Germany-e. .357 5842 0 -5706 .141 .816 OT 1.027
Denmark .369 36435 0 -36000 .182 .90 OT 1.028
Italy .247 2.428 .741 14.69 .153 .67 .228 .938
Netherlands no OC
data
Norway .389 47454 0 -46785 .203 .82 OT 1.030
Spain .400 341.6 .639 931.1 .110 .41 .731 .970
Sweden no OC
data
G. Britain .384 41.99 .743 118. .216 .70 .447 .949
US na na na na na na na na
Table 7: EOp policy; OC typology, EQ definition of income; h=0.06
6country aobs cobs aEOp cEOp abench r n e
GI.OC.ST Sv Cr
GBRC.EQ Sv Cr
NDAL.ST .533 10410 .384 10719 .270 .75 OT 1.017
Table 8: Miscellaneous; h=0.06
Key:
GI.OC.ST  takes the universe as immigrants in Germany, and performs the OC.ST calculation
GBRC.EQ is a typology in Great Britain, according to race (RC); the types are white or non-white.
NDAL.ST is a typology in the Netherlands where a person is either native born or foreign born (alien).  This calculation uses the EQ
definition of income.
7country aobs cobs aEOp cEOp a   bench r n e
Germany-w.
OC.ST
.361 5470 .451 17265 .223 .86 .82 .995
Germany-e.
OC.ST
.328 4825. 0 -6891 .159 .83 OT 1.012
Denmark
ED.ST
.440 41022 0 -53989 .251 .83 OT 1.018
Spain
ED.ST
.376 173 .748 819 .087 .51 .577 .973
Belgium
ED.ST
.531 148.9 .758 313 .320 .72 .647 .980
Netherlands
ED.ST
.533 10410 .745 42468 .277 .83 .717 .982
Norway
ED.ST
.393 45526 .255 -1157 .260 .74 OT 1.006
Sweden
ED.ST
.524 46886 0 -30207 .207 .88 OT 1.023
Britain
OC.ST
.364 38.43 .850 210.2 .071 .72 .471 .958
Italy
ED.ST
.232 2.688 .902 25.03 .157 .53 .126 .940
US
ED.ST
.243 2036 .815 18541 .184 .69 .127 .959
Table 9: Various EOp policies, h = 0.03
8ED=1 ED=2 ED=3
income quintile 1 .33 .52 .60
income quintile 2 .31 .44 .76
income quintile 3 .35 .44 .81
income quintile 4 .57 .61 .86
income quintile 5 .62 .68 .76
Table 10a: The matrix p( ,q) for the Netherlands
ED=1 ED=2 ED=3
income quintile 1 .15 .31 .55
income quintile 2 .14 .29 .62
income quintile 3 .16 .46 .72
income quintile 4 .20 .51 .78
income quintile 5 .43 .74 .88
Table 10b:  The matrix  p (i,q) for the US
9ED=1 ED=2 ED=3
income decile 1 .34 .34 .44
income decile 2 .36 .38 .48
income decile 3 .38 .41 .52
income decile 4 .41 .43 .55
income decile 5 .43 .45 .59
income decile 6 .46 .47 .63
income decile 7 .48 .49 .66
income decile 8 .50 .51 .70
income decile 9 .53 .53 .74
income decile 10 .55 .55 .77
Table 10c:  The matrix p(i,t) for Denmark
10
ED=1 ED=2 ED=3
income quintile 1 0.36 0.42 0.68
income quintile 2 0.30 0.41 0.69
income quintile 3 0.28 0.41 0.51
income quintile 4 0.52 0.43 0.75
income quintile 5 0.47 0.71 0.82
Table 10d:  The matrix p(i,t) for Sweden
11
country aEOp r n e
US  3 types ED.ST .647 .69 .200 .955
US 6 types (with IQ) .723 .61 .165 .941
DK 3 types ED.ST 0 .828 OT 1.035
DK 6 types (with IQ) 0 .710 OT 1.035
SW 3 types ED.ST 0 .88 OT 1.046
SW 6 types (with IQ) .257 .78 OT 1.027
ND 3 types ED.ST .470 .830 OT 1.007
ND 6 types (with IQ) .700 .69 .767 .959
Table 11:  Contrast of EOp policies, with and without IQ as a circumstance, h=.06
                   1
cumulative fraction
Figure 1
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Figure 2a.  Empirical distribution functions of pre-fisc income, three ED types, ST
definition  of income, US
Figure 2b. Empirical distribution functions of pre-fisc income, three ED types, Spain
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Figure 2c. Empirical distribution functions of pre-fisc income, ED types, Denmark
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